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irrational behavior on the part of 
market participants, or does it have a 
basis in rational behavior?
Many observers believe that the 
turbulence in asset prices results from 
bouts of optimism and pessimism 
among investors that have little to 
do with economic reality. More than 
60 years ago, John Maynard Keynes 
attributed these highs and lows in the 
stock market to the “animal spirits” 
that motivate humans to collectively 
take on or shun financial risk. Given 
the recent history of booms and 
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A Theory of Asset Price Booms and Busts 
and the Uncertain Return to Innovation*
asset prices, such as the price of 
company stock, the price of houses 
in a particular location, or the price 
of a foreign currency, can often 
rise strongly for many periods and 
then crash spectacularly. Does such 
turbulence in asset prices result from 
any observers believe that turbulence in asset 
prices results from bouts of optimism and 
pessimism among investors that have little to 
do with economic reality. While psychology 
and emotions are no doubt important motivators of 
human actions, an explanation for asset price booms 
and busts that ignores the fact that humans are also 
thinking animals does not seem entirely satisfactory or 
plausible. in this article, Satyajit Chatterjee presents a 
counterpoint to the view that “it’s all psychology.” he 
reports on a theory of asset price booms and busts that 
is based entirely on rational decision-making and devoid 
of psychological elements. The explanation suggests 
that asset price booms and crashes are most likely to 
occur when the value of the asset in question depends 
on an innovation whose full profit potential is initially 
unknown to investors. 
crashes in the industrialized world, 
the influence of mass psychology on 
asset prices has once again come to the 
fore. People wonder how much of the 
frenetic buying and selling in capital 
markets around the world serves any 
useful social purpose.   
While psychology and emotions 
are no doubt important motivators 
of human actions, an explanation 
for asset price booms and busts that 
ignores the fact that humans are also 
thinking animals does not seem entirely 
satisfactory or plausible. Why would 
investors believe that an asset will rise 
strongly in value unless there is, at 
some level, a good reason for such a 
belief? as a counterpoint to the view 
that “it’s all psychology,” this article 
reports on a theory of asset price 
booms and busts that is based entirely 
on rational decision-making and 
devoid of psychological elements. The 
explanation suggests that asset price 
booms and crashes are most likely to 
occur when the value of the asset in 
question depends on an innovation 
whose full profit potential is initially 
unknown to investors. as investors 
learn over time about what that 
earnings potential is, the price of the 
asset can rise strongly for a while and 
then crash. as an example, think of 
the advent of the World Wide Web in 
1990, an innovation that opened the 
door to the commercialization of the 
internet.1 initially, it was not evident 
*The views expressed here are those of the 
author and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the Federal Reserve bank of 
Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System.
1 The concept of the World Wide Web (or sim-
ply the web) was proposed by the english com-
puter scientist Tim berners-Lee and the belgian 
computer scientist Robert Cailliau in 1990. 
The originators conceived of the web as a vast 
information repository that anyone anywhere in 
the world could access via the internet.2   Q4  2011 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
how to make money using the web, 
but many new ideas were tried and 
investors and entrepreneurs learned 
over time what worked and what did 
not.
 
PRIMER ON THE 
DETERMINATION OF ASSET 
PRICES
What theory do economists use 
to discuss the determination of asset 
prices? The most basic and simplest 
of such theories asserts that the price 
an investor will pay to buy an asset 
today is related to the dividend the 
investor expects to receive on the asset 
in the future and the price at which 
he expects to sell the asset at a future 
date. an example will make this clear. 
Suppose that a single share in the 
stock of company X promises to pay $5 
in dividends one year from today. also 
suppose that investors expect the price 
of this single stock to be $100 a year 
from today. ignoring taxes, an investor 
who can put his money in the bank 
and earn a 5 percent interest rate will 
not be willing to pay more than $100 
for the stock today. if he paid $100, he 
will earn $5 in dividends and then sell 
the asset for $100. Therefore, he will 
have $105 from his investment a year 
from today. he can get the same dollar 
amount by saving $100 in the bank 
and earning a 5 percent return on it. 
Therefore, the market price of the 
asset cannot exceed $100. The market 
price of the asset cannot fall below 
$100 either because, if it did, then all 
investors who currently have their 
money in the bank would be better off 
removing their funds from the bank 
and buying the asset. They would earn 
a higher rate of return on the stock 
than on their bank accounts.
a bit more formally, the theory 
asserts that the current price of the 
asset, call it P, is simply the present 
discounted value of the dividend to be 
given out next period, call it D, plus 
the expected price of the asset next 
period, call it Pe.  as we just saw, it 
must be the case that the amount one 
can earn by keeping the money in the 
bank, namely, P(1+r) (where r is the 
interest rate on the bank deposit), must 
equal the amount one can earn from 
the stock, namely, [D+Pe]. Therefore, 
P(1+r) must equal [(D+Pe], so P must 
equal [D+Pe]÷(1+r). The essence of 
the economic theory of asset price 
determination is the idea that the 
rate of return on different but equally 
risky assets should be equalized. in 
the above example, we assumed that 
the return from holding the stock 
for one year was perfectly certain so 
that the rate of return on the stock 
had to equal the interest rate on bank 
deposits. if the return on the stock 
is uncertain, the theory takes into 
account that investors would demand 
a higher rate of return on the risky 
asset as compensation for bearing that 
risk and the price of the stock will be 
correspondingly lower, resulting in an 
expected capital gain.
DIVIDEND GROWTH AND 
GROWTH IN ASSET PRICES 
This simple theory of asset price 
determination, when coupled with a 
theory of how expectations about the 
next period’s asset price are formed, 
makes predictions about the level and 
growth of asset prices that depend 
only on fundamentals, in this case the 
dividend flow from the asset and the 
interest rate on bank accounts. This 
connection between fundamentals and 
asset prices can be somewhat subtle, 
and we will approach it through some 
simple examples.
imagine that the dividend from 
the stock is the same each period and 
the interest rate on bank deposits is 
constant over time. in this situation, 
an investor might reason that whatever 
the price of the asset is today, it will 
be the same in the next period. after 
all, if neither the dividend nor the 
interest rate changes, why should 
the price of the asset change? This 
kind of reasoning — which is at the 
heart of the theory of expectation 
formation that economists call rational 
expectations — leads to the prediction 
that the price of the asset will be the 
(constant) dividend flow D divided by 
the (constant) interest rate r.2
however, if dividends are growing 
over time at some constant rate and 
the interest rate is constant over time, 
the same investor might now reason 
that since the asset is becoming 
more profitable over time, its price 
should increase over time at the same 
constant rate as that of dividends. 
With this guess about the behavior of 
future asset prices, the theory predicts 
that the price of the asset in period 
t will be the dividend to be given 
out next period, D, divided by the 
difference between the interest rate, 
r, and the growth rate of dividends, 
g. That is, the current asset price will 
simply be D divided by (r-g). Since 
the dividend given out each period 
is growing over time at rate g, this 
What theory do 
economists use 
to discuss the 
determination of 
asset prices? 
2 This formula can be obtained by solving the 
equation P = [D+P]/[1+r] for P (in terms of D 
and r). The investor’s guess that if the dividend 
flow and the interest rate are both constant over 
time then the price of the asset will be constant 
over time is employed to replace Pe (the future 
price) with P (the current price). Notice that 
the investor’s guess that the future price of the 
asset will be the same as it is today is indeed 
verified by the resulting formula for P: the 
formula depends only on D and r, both of which 
are constant over time.  3 it is perhaps worth pointing out that the inter-
est rate available on a bank account will typi-
cally depend on the dividend flow from other 
investments available in the economy. So, r and 
g will not be independent of each other. indeed, 
the dependence of the interest rate on the 
dividend flow available in the economy is what 
guarantees that the interest rate, r, will always 
be greater than the growth rate, g. Without this 
ordering, the formula gives nonsensical results.
4 The S&P 500 index is proportional to the 
average stock price of 500 large U.S.-based cor-
porations whose shares are traded on U.S. stock 
markets. The theory outlined in the text applies 
equally well to such averages.   
5 The NaSDaQ index is the average stock price 
of over 3,000 corporations (not necessarily U.S. 
based) whose shares are traded on U.S. stock 
markets and that are oriented toward high-
technology areas.
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formula confirms the investor’s guess 
that the asset price will grow at the 
same constant rate as dividends.3
Thus, the simple theory of asset 
price determination links the growth 
in asset prices to the growth in 
dividends. but this simple theory does 
not come to grips with the behavior of 
asset prices during a boom. During a 
boom, asset prices seem to grow faster 
than the growth rate of dividends. 
as an example of this phenomenon, 
Figure 1 displays the time paths of the 
logarithm of the S&P 500 index and 
of the logarithm of earnings per share 
for the index for the period around the 
tech boom.4 On a logarithmic scale, 
steeper lines imply faster growth, and 
we can see that between 1995 and 
2001, the index grew at a faster rate, 
while the growth in earnings did not 
show any tendency to grow faster.
One can see the increase in 
the growth rate of stock prices even 
more clearly in the time path of the 
NaSDaQ composite index.5 Figure 2 
plots the logarithm of the NaSDaQ 
index for the same time period as in 
Figure 1. between 1990 and 1995, the 
time path is more or less a straight 
line, which implies that the index grew 
at a roughly constant rate. Following 
1995, however, the angle of the path 
tilts up, implying faster growth in asset 
prices. This continues until the market 
crash we associate with the end of the 
dot-com boom. Unfortunately, there is 
no easily available series on earnings 
Earnings and Stock Prices: S&P 500
FIGURE 1
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Cessation of Dividend Growth 
Can Induce an Asset Price Crash. 
as we have seen already, growth in 
dividends increases the price of the 
asset because the asset becomes more 
profitable for investors. Therefore, in 
order to value the asset today investors 
have to form beliefs about future 
dividend growth. in this situation, 
uncertainty about whether growth in 
dividends will continue or stop can 
have surprising consequences for the 
price of the asset. 
imagine that investors put a 50 
percent probability on dividend growth 
coming to a stop next period and a 
50 percent probability that dividends 
will continue to grow at the same rate 
as in the past. Then, if the growth in 
dividends does stop next period, the 
theory of asset price determination 
predicts that the price of the asset 
will fall. at first sight this might seem 
puzzling because the profitability of 
the asset hasn’t fallen: The asset is 
generating the same dividend flow as 
it did in the previous period. however, 
investors yesterday had put an equal 
Can uncertainty about the duration 
of dividend growth explain asset 
price booms and crashes? 
growth for the NaSDaQ index, but 
all anecdotal evidence suggests that 
there was no corresponding speed-up 
in the growth rate of earnings.
The apparent disconnect between 
the growth rate of fundamentals (in 
this case, earnings) and the growth 
rate of asset prices makes observers 
think that something other than 
fundamentals (“animal spirits” or mass 
psychology) is at work. While mass 
psychology may well influence asset 
prices, it turns out that the simple 
theory of asset price determination 
outlined above can shed considerable 
light on the origin and mechanics of 
asset price booms and crashes.
The key insight is that market 
participants’ beliefs regarding how 
long dividend growth will continue 
may play a crucial role in generating 
an asset price boom and crash.6 
When there is an innovation, such 
as the World Wide Web, investors 
may be uncertain about the full profit 
potential of the innovation — that 
is, they do not know in advance how 
far, or in what ways, the World Wide 
Web can be used for commerce. This 
creates uncertainty about the duration 
of earnings growth. as the innovation 
continues to diffuse through the 
economy and earnings continue 
to grow, investors revise up their 
estimate of the profit potential of the 
innovation. This upward revision may 
temporarily make the asset price rise 
faster than earnings. When earnings 
growth comes to a halt and investors 
learn the limits of the innovation, the 
asset price crashes. Thus, a boom can 
happen without a speed-up in earnings 
growth, while the cessation of earnings 
growth can result in a crash.7  These 
ideas are fleshed out in the next two 
sections.
chance on dividends continuing to 
grow today and the price of the asset 
yesterday reflected that expectation. 
if dividends fail to grow today, the 
asset becomes less valuable to investors 
today compared with yesterday. Thus, 
the mere cessation of dividend growth 
will cause the asset price to fall.
Can uncertainty about the 
duration of dividend growth explain 
asset price booms and crashes? That 
is, can it provide an explanation for 
the phenomena displayed in Figures 
1 and 2? To explore this question, 
we will work with a simple example. 
The interest rate available on bank 
accounts is taken to be 1 percent per 
quarter. Suppose that there is an asset 
whose dividend flow is currently $100. 
Next quarter, there is a ¾ probability 
that the asset’s dividend flow will 
increase by 5 percent (i.e., rise to $105) 
and there is a ¼ probability that its 
dividend flow will stop growing and 
stay at $100 forever. if the dividend 
flow increases next quarter, the 
situation next quarter will be the same 
as in the current quarter: namely, 
there will be a ¾ probability that 
the dividend flow will increase by 5 
percent again in the following quarter 
(to $110.25) and there will be a  ¼ 
probability that the dividend flow will 
stabilize forever at $105. Thus, as long 
as dividends continue to grow, there 
is a constant probability that this 
growth will continue next period and a 
(complementary) constant probability 
that growth in dividends will come to 
a stop forever.
Figure 3 displays a snapshot of 
the time paths of the logarithms of 
6 This discussion draws on the 1999 article by 
Joseph Zeira.  
7 From the point of view of valuing an asset, 
the main quantity of interest is the growth rate 
of earnings. but to assess the validity of an 
earnings-growth forecast, investors will examine 
many sources of information. For instance, they 
may track the increase in the number of visitors 
to a website as an indicator of commercial inter-
est. During the tech boom, investor interest in 
various measures of internet use (such as the 
number of websites and the number of “hits” per 
website) was quite intense, and these measures 
were used to justify very optimistic earnings 
forecasts for internet-related businesses. The 
point, however, is that such optimism could be 
sustained because investors were truly uncertain 
about the profit potential of this new way of 
conducting commerce.Business Review  Q4  2011   5 www.philadelphiafed.org
dividends and asset prices predicted 
by the simple theory of asset price 
determination. The theory predicts 
that as long as dividends continue to 
grow, the price of the asset will grow 
at the same rate as the growth in 
dividends. in the figure, this is what 
happens for the periods preceding 
period 45: The time plot of the 
logarithm of asset prices and dividends 
rises at the same rate. at period 45, 
however, dividends stop growing, 
and the time plot of the dividend 
path flattens out. as displayed, the 
cessation of dividend growth causes 
a crash in the asset price. Following 
the crash, the time path of the asset 
price flattens out as well: Recall that 
the theory of asset price determination 
predicts that if dividends are constant 
over time, so will be the price of the 
asset.8
The crash in the asset price 
reflects investors’ re-assessment of 
the profitability of the asset. Prior 
to the cessation of dividend growth, 
investors placed a three in four chance 
on dividend growth continuing into 
period 45, a nine in 16 chance of 
dividend growth continuing into 
period 46, a 27 in 64 chance of growth 
continuing into period 47 and so on.9 
Consequently, the price of the asset 
in period 44 incorporated investors’ 
8 it is worth pointing out that in this example, 
the growth rate of dividends exceeds the inter-
est rate on bank accounts (5 percent versus 
1 percent).  Nevertheless, the simple theory 
of asset price determination applies because 
investors recognize that dividend growth will 
not continue forever. according to the theory, 
the growth rate of dividends can be higher than 
the interest rate as long as the product of the 
probability of growth continuing and (1+g) is 
less than (1+r). 
9 The nine in 16 chance comes from recognizing 
that the probability that dividends will grow for 
two consecutive periods is simply the product 
of  ¾ and  ¾,  or (¾)2. Similarly, the probability 
that dividends will grow for three consecutive 
periods is (¾)3 or 27 in 64. More generally, the 
probability of n consecutive periods is (¾3)n.
belief that dividends will continue to 
rise in period 45 and beyond with high 
probability. When these beliefs are 
belied by events, the price of the asset 
tumbles.
it appears, then, that the simple 
theory of asset price determination 
predicts sudden drops in asset prices 
that stem simply from a downward 
re-assessment of the growth potential of 
the earnings flow underlying the asset. 
because the bad news that leads to the 
crash concerns diminished prospects 
for future growth, the asset price may 
fall even if the current dividend flow 
does not fall. 
Learning About the Likely 
Duration of Dividend Growth Can 
Induce an Asset Price Boom and 
Crash. but how can this simple model 
of asset price determination account 
for the boom in the price of assets? as 
noted earlier, we cannot attempt to 
account for the tech boom in terms of 
faster dividend growth because there is 
no evidence of a speed-up in earnings 
growth during the boom phase.
it turns out that the model can 
account for the boom and the crash 
if we allow for the realistic possibility 
that investors’ beliefs concerning 
the duration of dividend growth 
may evolve over time. instead of 
imagining that investors assign a 
constant probability to dividend 
growth continuing (or, equivalently, 
a constant probability of it coming to 
an end), imagine that investors start 
off believing that dividend growth 
will last somewhere between eight and 
15 years. That is, they believe that 
dividend growth will continue for sure 
until period 32 (since each period is 
a quarter, eight years amount to 32 
quarters) and stop for sure by period 
60. but they are uncertain about the 
duration of the expansion between 
these two dates.
Figure 4 displays the time plot 
of the logarithm of the asset price 
implied by these beliefs when dividend 
growth stops in period 45 (as before, 
















20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80
Years6   Q4  2011 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
we assume that the interest rate is 1 
percent per quarter). Notice that the 
time plot of the logarithm of asset 
price grows at more or less a constant 
rate until period 32. but after period 
32 and until the crash in period 45, the 
growth rate of prices is faster, although 
there is no change in the growth rate 
of dividends.
This surprising outcome is the 
result of the evolution of investors’ 
beliefs regarding the likelihood of 
the different dates at which the 
expansion might stop. To understand 
this point, notice that in period 32, 
an investor assigns a 1/28 chance that 
the expansion will continue to period 
33, a 1/28 chance that it will continue 
to period 34, and so forth, because 
there are 28 possible dates (33 to 60) 
at which the expansion might stop 
and the investor is equally uncertain 
about at which date the expansion will 
stop. but once this investor learns that 
the expansion has, in fact, continued 
into period 33, he will assign a higher 
chance to the expansion’s continuing 
to period 34 and beyond. This is 
because there are now only 27 possible 
dates left, and investors will assign 
each date a 1/27 chance.  Thus, as the 
expansion continues, the investor will 
assign a higher and higher probability 
to the expansion’s continuing to the 
fewer remaining dates.
What all this amounts to is that 
as the expansion continues beyond 
period 32, investors successively 
eliminate the possibility of relatively 
unfavorable outcomes in favor of an 
increase in the likelihood of relatively 
favorable ones. For instance, if the 
expansion continues on to period 35, 
investors know that the expansion 
will go on until some date that lies 
between periods 36 and 60. This is 
a more favorable assessment of the 
asset’s earning potential than what 
investors believed in any earlier 
period. Of course, once the expansion 
stops, all of the remaining favorable 
outcomes to which investors had 
previously assigned a positive chance 
are eliminated, and that elimination 
results in a sharp fall in the price of 
the asset.10
There are some additional points 
worth making. First, the boom and 
crash scenario depends on the timing 
of the cessation of dividend growth. if 
the expansion in dividends continues 
all the way to period 60, there will 
be a boom but no crash: The price 
of the asset will simply stabilize at 
its peak value and stay at that level 
forever. at the other extreme, if the 
dividend expansion comes to a stop 
in period 33, there will be a crash 
but no boom. To get a boom-bust 
scenario, the expansion in dividends 
must last longer than the minimum 
period of expansion but less than the 
maximum period of expansion.  Of 
course, in reality, investors cannot be 
completely certain about the minimum 
and maximum periods of expansion. 
but the explanation will work as long 
as the duration of the expansion falls 
somewhere near the “middle regions” 
of the set of possible outcomes.
Second, Figure 1 indicates that 
there was also a crash in operating 
earnings when the tech boom ended, 
something that is not true of the 
explanation given above. but this is 
not an important deviation between 
theory and fact. There was a crash 
in earnings because learning also 
affected corporate decisions. high-
tech corporations discovered that 
they had invested “too much” in 
information and communications 
10 For the example shown in Figure 4, the aver-
age annual growth in asset prices prior to period 
33 is 3.13 percent, the annual growth between 
periods 33 and 44 is 9.80 percent, and the drop 
in asset value at the time of the crash is 31 
percent.   
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It is also true that boom-bust scenarios do 
not happen all the time, which suggests 
that their occurrence requires a particular 
confluence of events. The important question 
to ask is: Under what circumstances are the 
assumptions of the theory likely to be met? 
technology capacity because they too 
believed there was some chance that 
the expansion in profit opportunities 
would continue beyond 2001.11 The 
write-offs related to this “excess 
investment” contributed to corporate 
bankruptcies and a drop in operating 
earnings. Consistent with this 
situation, there was also a crash in 
information and communication 
technology (iCT) investment, which, 
in turn, led to the brief recession of 
2001-02. The recession contributed to 
the drop in corporate earnings as well.
Third, Figure 1 also shows that 
following the crash in prices and 
operating earnings, growth in earnings 
recovered quickly, which seems 
inconsistent with the theory outlined 
above. however, we have to recognize 
that an index as broad as the S&P 
500 is affected by more than just the 
high-technology sector. as we are 
all too well aware now, the high-tech 
boom was followed closely by a boom 
in housing and construction. although 
a variety of factors contributed to the 
housing boom and subsequent bust, at 
the center of the boom and crash was 
yet another innovation — this time in 
financial markets in the form of the 
securitized subprime mortgage.12
INNOVATIONS AND ASSET 
PRICE BOOMS AND CRASHES
The above explanation of a 
boom-bust scenario is special. it 
assumes that the uncertainty regarding 
dividend growth is of a particular kind 
(uncertainty regarding the duration 
of expansion) and that investors put 
                                                                                                    
11 See Robert Gordon’s article on how iCT 
capacity outstripped iCT demand and led to 
corporate bankruptcies and a slowdown in iCT 
investment in early 2000.
12 See the book by Gary Gorton for a discussion 
of the nature of the financial innovation in 
mortgage markets that, in part, contributed to 
the housing boom and, ultimately, to the cur-
rent mortgage crisis.
an equal probability weight on the 
expansion’s stopping between two 
fixed future time periods. however, it 
is also true that boom-bust scenarios 
do not happen all the time, which 
suggests that their occurrence requires 
a particular confluence of events. 
The important question to ask is: 
Under what circumstances are the 
assumptions of the theory likely to be 
met? 
imagine a situation in which there 
is a new discovery or innovation that 
is truly novel. For such an innovation, 
the past is a poor guide for judging the 
innovation’s profit potential. investors 
understand that the innovation will 
create new opportunities, but no 
one is certain about the innovation’s 
ultimate profit potential. in this 
situation, the basic assumptions of 
the simple model outlined above seem 
plausible. investors know that the 
innovation will generate new business 
opportunities over time (increasing 
profits or dividends) until, at some 
point in the future, the innovation’s 
profit potential will stabilize and profits 
will stop growing (or will grow at the 
rate of growth of the overall economy).  
but no one knows when this stage of 
“normal” profits (or profit growth) 
will arrive, and past experience is of 
no help in making a guess. in this 
situation, the principle of indifference 
suggests that investors may well put 
an equal probability weight on the 
expansion’s stopping any time between 
the two future dates.13 This will be 
the case, for instance, if investors 
currently expect the expansion to last 
somewhere between five to 10 years.
historically, booms in asset 
prices have, in fact, followed truly 
novel innovations or events. in 
describing the genesis of financial 
crises in Western europe, the financial 
historian Charles Kindleberger 
summarizes the historical record thus: 
“The macroeconomic system receives 
a shock…a ‘displacement’. This 
displacement can be monetary or real. 
What is significant is that it changes 
expectations in financial markets 
with respect to the profitability of 
some range of investments. New 
profit opportunities are opened up, 
and people move to take advantage 
of them.”14 again, in another work, 
Kindleberger states: “The nature of 
the displacement varies from one 
speculative boom to another. it may 
be the outbreak or end of war, a 
bumper harvest or crop failure, the 
widespread adoption of an invention 
with pervasive effects — canals, 
railroads, the automobile — some 
political event or surprising financial 
13 The “principle of indifference” asserts that if 
there is no knowledge indicating that any one 
outcome among N possible outcomes is more 
likely than another, each outcome should be 
assigned an equal chance of occurring, namely, 
a chance of 1/N.
14 Kindleberger, 1993, p. 524.8   Q4  2011 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
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success, or a debt conversion that 
precipitously lowers interest rates. 
but whatever the source of the 
displacement, if it is sufficiently 
large and pervasive, it will alter the 
economic outlook by changing profit 
opportunities in at least one important 
sector of the economy. Displacement 
brings opportunities for profit in some 
new or existing lines, and closes out 
others. as a result, business firms 
and individuals with savings or credit 
seek to take advantage of the former 
and retreat from the latter. if the new 
opportunities dominate those that lose, 
investment and production pick up. a 
boom is under way.”15 
The boom in house prices in the 
mid to late 2000s can, in part, be 
traced to a financial innovation — the 
securitized subprime mortgage — 
whose true profit potential was initially 
unknown. The tech boom of the 1990s 
was a direct consequence of the spread 
of iCT and the rise of the World Wide 
Web. The boom of the 1920s could 
arguably be traced to the revolutionary 
effects of the automobile. The boom of 
the 1850s (in the U.S.) could be traced 
to the revolutionary effects of railroads. 
arguably, each of these booms ended 
in a crash when investors came to a 
more precise understanding of the 
innovation’s profit potential.
15 Kindleberger, 1978, p. 18.
The explanation for the boom-
bust scenario described in this article 
is based on the fact that investors 
learn about the asset’s profit potential 
over time. and what they learn 
can cause them to strongly revise 
their perception of the asset’s value. 
The basic idea regarding the role of 
learning is present in other studies that 
go beyond the simple model discussed 
above. For instance, researchers 
have shown that the transaction 
costs of trading in financial markets 
coupled with learning about an asset’s 
profitability over time can lead to 
abrupt and sharp movements in asset 
prices, so that asset prices may appear 
to be much more volatile than the 
flow of dividends.16 This finding is 
important because the low variability 
of dividend flow compared with the 
high variability of asset prices is often 
taken as evidence that fundamentals 
(i.e., dividend flow) have little to do 
with asset price fluctuations.
SUMMARY
There is considerable 
circumstantial evidence supporting 
the notion that asset price booms 
and busts follow the advent of novel 
innovations that are expected to have 
pervasive effects on the economy. if 
this is accepted as a starting point 
for further analysis, the problem 
becomes one of understanding why 
and how innovation and novelty 
generate asset booms and busts. The 
simple model outlined above provides 
one explanation. it stresses the fact 
that truly novel innovations create 
uncertainty in the mind of investors 
regarding the innovation’s ultimate 
profit potential, and the resolution 
of this uncertainty can first lead to a 
boom and then a crash.  
The informational theory of 
booms and busts suggests that such 
episodes are inevitable, since they arise 
from deep-seated forces governing the 
evolution of industrial economies. it 
implies that there is more than a grain 
of truth to the notion that boom-bust 
scenarios are unique (“this time it’s 
different”) in that these episodes result 
from circumstances that are truly 
novel, such as the advent of railroads, 
the automobile, the personal computer, 
and the internet. B R
16 See the article by in ho Lee for a discussion of 
this point. as the author explains, transaction 
costs can keep an investor from immediately 
trading on new information that becomes avail-
able to him. Thus, information relevant to the 
value of the asset can remain hidden until some 
shock (which could be relatively minor) forces 
all investors who had refrained from trading 
to trade. at that point, information that was 
hitherto dispersed and hidden among investors 
gets reflected in the price, which can cause the 
price to change abruptly.     
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